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Muzzles and Mixed Messages:
Issues Between Science and the Federal
Government In Canada’s Past and
Present
Katherine Richter
University of King’s college
aBsTracT
Richter examines the historical relationship between the federal government of Canada and the scientists it has employed
over the past few decades. She compares science policy and
practices from leaders such as Diefenbaker and Trudeau to the
policies currently followed by Stephen Harper’s government.
Richter asks what might be achieved by following those policies, despite the criticism received by the science community.
The paper will ultimately argue that the federal government
and scientists have often had a contentious relationship, and
the often criticized policies of the current Conservative government are not at all novel. Ultimately, she argues that these
Conservative policies are intended to present a unified political
front to the broader Canadian public and to the world.
Keywords: science, federal government, policy, public, political
history
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T

he policy of “muzzling” scientists who work for the
federal government has received plenty of attention in Canada over
the last six years. Scientists, scholars, research committees, and the
media have all accused Stephen Harper’s current Conservative
government of creating policies that keep scientists from presenting
their work, that require them to make media statements through
government handlers, or that bog down the process of interviews
through the need for seemingly endless amounts of paperwork.
Techniques such as these led the NDP in the House of Commons to
question: when would the Conservative government “end their war
against our scientists?”1
Very few would deny that these policies and practices have a
silencing effect on scientists. The question then is what purpose these
policies might serve. This paper will examine the history between the
federal government and the scientists it employed over the past few
decades, and how that relationship has been marred by the same
problems the Conservative government is accused of creating today. It
will then examine the Conservative government’s current policy in
regards to science, of which muzzling is one part, and will ask what is
the intended objective. This paper will ultimately argue that the
federal government and scientists have often had a contentious
relationship, and the policies the Conservative government is
currently implementing are not new. They are part of a larger plan by
the government to get scientific researchers to follow and uphold the
goals the government intends to pursue. These policies are essentially
in place to control information, intended to present a unified political
front to the world and to the broader Canadian public, while
simultaneously opening Canada to international investment and
economic interests.
Canada has often been recognized as a leader and innovator in
science and technology, and our history is studded with examples that
showcase our talent. Take, for example, the hydrofoil boat invented
by Alexander Graham Bell and Casey Baldwin, or the invention of
insulin by Banting and Best. Canadians themselves are interested in
1. Emily Chung, “Federal Scientists Muzzled by Media Policies, Report Suggests,” CBC News, October
8, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/federal-scientists-muzzled-by-media-policies-reportsuggests-1.2791650
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science and technology; one report released in 2014 by the Council of
Canadian Academies put the Canadian public in first place out of 33
countries for showing a strong interest in “new scientific discoveries
and technological developments.”2 However, this history has been
marred by struggles between the federal government and scientists
over differing opinions, funding research and political ideology. This
has not been happening only in the last six years, but since science
became a subject of interest to the government.
While the muzzling of scientists is a major criticism towards
the Conservative government’s recent policies against science and
scientists, it is only one part of those policies. Other actions include
slashing funding to various research boards or councils, or insisting
on the appointment of various people that the media and scientists
claim have no right in interfering with scientific progress.
Bureaucratic or even Prime Ministerial influence has also been
claimed as a direct affront to science. However, it is important to note
that all these policy actions have taken place before in Canada’s
history.
The federal government and scientists have enjoyed a rocky
relationship for decades, and to claim surprise at the current
government’s policies is to ignore Canada’s political past. Take for
example the criticism of budget cuts to science. In the past few years,
climate science has been a particular target for the federal
government. As Andrew Cuddy points out in his paper on the
Harper government’s approach to climate science research, funding
from the federal government for university-based research (through
channels such as the National Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada, or NSERC) has been slashed, making NSERC’s
budget fall to less than half of their original funding since
2010-2011.3 This is particularly upsetting for researchers, as the
country is currently dealing with a climate change crisis. As one
scientist from Dalhousie University noted, “Canada will lose the
capacity to understand its own environment and will have to rely on
other countries to know what’s happening to it.”4 Bill C-38,
2. “Science Culture: Where Canada Stands,” Council of Canadian Academies, accessed October 14,
2014, xvi, http://www.scienceadvice.ca/en/assessments/completed/science-culture.aspx
3. Cuddy, Troubling Evidence, 15.
4. Ibid.
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the Harper government’s omnibus budget bill released in July 2012,
also cut funding and issued letters of potential layoff to thousands of
scientists and researchers in the federal government “on a level not
previously seen, or tolerated.”5
These concerns about the federal government cutting funding
for scientific research (while valid) are not new. Issues such as these
have been arising for decades. For example, many saw the creation of
the Science Council of Canada (or SCC) in the mid-1960s as a
gesture that gave new importance to the scientific and post-war world
and that spoke to the important financial and advisory relationship
between science and the federal government.6 The SCC relied on
federal funding, and for years provided independent “arms-length”
advice to both the public and the federal government by releasing
scientific reports on a variety of subjects. However, the Council ran
into trouble in 1978 when it released a report on the problems facing
the Canadian industry and manufacturing areas. It essentially implied
the economic structures of the country were so poor that Canada
could be considered a “third-world country.”7 This did not sit well
with the federal government, and by 1985, Brian Mulroney’s
Conservative government released a report (also known as the Nielsen
report) that would lead to the decimation of the SCC’s budget (which
halved their five million dollar budget).8 Although the SCC managed
to hang on with its new minuscule budget that barely allowed for the
continuation of its research, let alone funding for new projects, the
budget cut represented a blow that the SCC could never recover
from, and the program folded in 1992.9 The federal government
began to perceive the SCC as a threat to its economic policies, and
used the Nielsen report to justify its funding cuts to that threat, an
attitude that is also seen in today’s political climate.
Another major criticism of the Harper government’s current
actions towards science and scientific research comes from its
perceived interference with the scientific community through
bureaucrats, ministerial spokespeople and even media handlers. One
5. Turner, The War on Science, 8.
6. G. Brent Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy and the Retreat From Transformative Politics: The
Final Years of the Science Council of Canada, 1985-1992,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the
History of Science, Technology and Medicine 35.1 (2012): 108.
7. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,”119.
8. Ibid., 125.
9. Ibid., 126.
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of the most striking examples was in 2012, when federal government
media handlers shadowed Environment Canada scientists to prevent
them discussing polar bears or climate change with reporters at an
international conference on polar issues.10 Chris Turner cites another
example of non-scientific interference in scientific business through
the implementation of Bill C-38. According to Turner, this bill,
which so drastically cut federally funded science projects and fired
hundreds of researchers, was put together in a set of private meetings
by lawyers, party staffers, a farmer, management consultants and a
fighter pilot – but no scientists or researchers.11 How, Turner seems to
be asking, can we expect science to be given the proper respect it
deserves in policy if no scientists are involved in the decisions that
will decide its future?
Yet this political interference in what many consider the realm
of scientists has been around since scientific research began to interest
the federal government – indeed, some interference has been a direct
result of the Prime Minister himself. This attitude of muzzling (or at
least ignoring) scientists and industry experts can be striking. One of
the most famous examples comes from Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker, who led the Progressive Conservative party in the federal
government from 1957 to 1963. He held an attitude that gave low
priority to scientists and he also apparently objected to being
surrounded “with bureaucratic advisors – scientists or otherwise.”12
This dislike of other opinions would be demonstrated in
Diefenbaker’s decision to cancel the Avro Arrow project in 1959. He
based his decision on the growing costs for the project, and the socalled “obsolescence” of having a manned bomber threaten Canadian
airspace, ignoring the hundreds of calls from industry experts and
scientists to save the project.13 With one stroke, Diefenbaker cut the
program and sent many of Canada’s top scientists and industry
leaders looking for jobs elsewhere.
Diefenbaker also demonstrated his attitude towards scientists
by insisting on the construction of a new radar laboratory in his home
10. Jonathon Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.” Maclean’s, May 3, 2013. http://www.macleans.ca/
news/canada/when-science-goes-silent/
11. Turner, The War on Science, 29.
12. G. Bruce Doern, Science and Politics in Canada (Toronto: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972),
144.
13. Doern, Science and Politics in Canada, 145.
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riding of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan in 1957. Researchers had
suggested building the laboratory in the area of the nearby city of
Saskatoon, as it would be closer to the University of Saskatchewan
and suited the preferences of the Defense Research Board. Instead,
the laboratory was built in Prince Albert, and served as another
example of Diefenbaker’s refusal to listen to scientists, and to instead
pursue agendas and plans he believed were right.14 This attitude might
well come from Diefenbaker’s desire to uphold his particular image: a
politician concerned with the common man, not the bureaucrats and
pencil-pushers. By doing what he thought was right, Diefenbaker
demonstrated to the voting public that “experts” had no sway over his
final decisions. Kenneth McNaught goes so far as to label
Diefenbaker’s party leadership as near-populist.15 While these
examples may stem from Diefenbaker’s personal motivations (doing
good for the average voter) or mistrusts (of scientists and
bureaucrats), they are still somewhat shocking, even in today’s cynical
political-scientific climate.
Another example of political interference in the scientific
sphere can be found by examining the history of the Defense
Research Board (DRB). This board, which was created in 1947 and
lasted until 1977, was designed to meet Canada’s research needs
during the post-war years. Its agenda was directly related to the
federal government in that its mandate was to serve the Minister and
related Department of National Defense (DND).16 Both scientists
and industry leaders sat on the board. However, by the 1950’s
tensions were rising over the new implementation of portfolios such
as the Department of Defense Production, which was seen by some as
adding political opinions and more bureaucrats to the scientific
realm.17 This complaint would be repeated when experts in
administration and organization, commissioned by the federal
government, released a report criticizing the structure of the DND in
1972. The subsequent criticism from the DND – how were nonmilitary and non-scientific ‘experts’ able to understand, let alone
17. Jonathan Turner, “Politics and Defence Research in the Cold War,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian
Journal of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine 35.1 (2012): 55, doi: 10.7202/1013980ar
15. Kenneth McNaught, The Pelican History of Canada (Markham: Penguin Books, 1983), 300.
16. Turner, “Politics and Defense Research,” 41.
17. Ibid., 50.
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criticize the work of military science and technology – was ignored.
In another example, all appointments to the DRB had to be approved
by the Minister of National Defense, from the secretaries to the
highest researchers on the board.19 Ultimately, these examples may be
reminiscent of policies pursued in recent years by Stephen Harper’s
Conservative government, but they do demonstrate that political
interference has the power to effect some serious change, and it has
done so for a very long time.
Finally, Harper’s government has been most heavily criticized
on the “muzzling” of scientists – that is, preventing federal scientists
from presenting papers, implementing new media policies that forbid
them from talking to the media, or even threatening them with severe
sanctions should they not comply. For example, Jonathon Gatehouse’s
article for Maclean’s magazine describes a situation where a federal
scientist at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was given a
formal reprimand for talking to the media without receiving
permission from the minister’s office. He was informed he could
potentially lose his job if the incident occurred again.20 This situation
was criticized as a lost educational opportunity for other scientists and
for the Canadian public. It should be noted that the scientist was not
named in the Maclean’s article, for fear of “further sanctions.”21 This
fear is not isolated to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans: one
report jointly released by Evidence for Democracy and Simon Fraser
University noted that 90% of federal scientists felt they were unable
“to speak freely about their research.”22
That same report heavily criticized the new media policies of
government departments, including Environment Canada, the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the Canadian Space Agency, and
Natural Resources Canada. These policies have attracted plenty of
attention. For example, the media policy at Environment Canada
insists that scientists put all media inquiries to a media relations
officer, who will then determine if the scientist can respond or not.
That same media policy also insists that scientists give no personal
18

18. Ibid., 61.
19. Ibid., 52.
20. Jonathon Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent,” Maclean’s, May 3, 2013, http://www.macleans.ca/
news/canada/when-science-goes-silent/.
21. Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.”
22. Karen Magnuson-Ford and Katie Gibbs, “Can Scientists Speak?” Evidence For Democracy, 3,
accessed October 12th, 2014.
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opinions when speaking in an official capacity, either on the subject at
hand or on Environment Canada policy in general.23 These restrictive
and time-consuming policies have resulted in a significant decrease in
the amount of media coverage that science and science-related issues
now receive, writes Andrew Cuddy in a critique on the current
government’s approaches to climate science research.24 Cuddy also
notes that this same Environment Canada policy could potentially
violate the government’s Communications Policy, which recognizes
institutions must understand and appreciate the importance of the
“24 hour media environment.”25 These are only a few examples, but
they serve as proof that the Harper government is using bureaucracy,
power and policy to stop (or at the very least, slow down) scientist’s
attempts to communicate important results and breakthroughs with
the media.
However, once again, this idea of “muzzling” scientists
through government policy is not new, and the troubles of the nowdead Science Council of Canada (SCC), created in the mid-1960s,
serve as an excellent example. It was created as a step towards
“technological sovereignty”, and was designed to assist to the federal
government and the Canadian public by providing “arms-length”
advice on science and policy.26 It was supposed to operate separately
from the influences of the government: this was what gave it
credibility. Yet as it fell under criticism in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the
Minister of State for Science and Technology suddenly suggested the
SCC be merged into his department, thereby removing that “arm’s
length” position that was so important to the Council’s independent
nature. The Council was horrified, and while they would manage to
keep their independence,27 the budget cuts that accompanied these
suggestions would kill the council. Interestingly, in public press
conferences held around the same time, Council members described
the financial cuts as “an attempt to muzzle the Council and destroy its
independent voice (emphasis added).”28 Thanks to this massive
budget reduction, the Council could only serve in the late 1980’s as
23. Magnuson-Ford and Gibbs, “Can Scientists Speak?” 13.
24. Andrew Cuddy, Troubling Evidence: The Harper Government’s Approach to Climate Science Research in
Canada (Ottawa: Climate Action Network Canada, 2010), 1.
25. Cuddy, Troubling Evidence, 25.
26. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,” 108.
27. Ibid., 125.
28. Ibid.
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an information station, telling Canadians where their scientific
futures could have lain,29 instead of their original purpose, which had
been to inform and even influence the federal government and the
Canadian public based on sound science. Just as federal scientists are
silenced today by government policy, so too were scientists from the
1970s and 1980s.
It is important to note that these were policies upheld by both
Liberal and Conservative political parties in the federal government.
Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives may have profited from
this silencing (or perhaps took inspiration from it – they, after all,
released the Nielsen report), but it became an issue under Pierre
Trudeau’s Liberals in the 1970’s. Trudeau’s two terms were marked by
demonstrations of strength in his majority position, and included acts
such as the enlargement of the Office of the Prime Minister and the
consolidation of several departmental organizations.30 This desire to
demonstrate the power of the federal government could be seen in
these silencing policies, as well as the criticisms of the DND in 1972.
Perhaps Trudeau’s government used their majority to prove to others
they had the power to do what they wanted, and could chose to listen
to whomever they wanted? Whatever the government’s motivation, it
was scientists that suffered for it.
Ultimately, these historical examples demonstrate that the
policies pursued by Harper’s Conservative government are not new,
and that past federal governments have pursued similar policies.
Whether through funding cuts, interference by bureaucrats at all
levels, or implementation of media and management policies, the
government has proven it is not afraid to use the tools it has at its
disposal such as legislative power and political clout to silence its
scientific critics, or to override them should they not serve the
government’s interests. The question is, what purpose does the
government believe this muzzling policy serves – and does that
purpose serve the Canadian public in a positive or a negative way?
There may be a variety of reasons for the Harper government to
follow this trend of silencing or ignoring scientific opinion, but one
of the major explanations seems to be a desire for a show of power
and cohesive agreement within all government departments. This may
29. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,” 133.
30. McNaught, Pelican History of Canada, 315.
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stem from the Stephen Harper’s own practice to never be seen making
public gaffes. As Jonathon Gatehouse for Maclean’s writes, Harper is
“rarely caught on the wrong foot [and is] Disciplined…above all with
the media.”31 This discipline comes from the control of information,
and knowing who has said what in relation to government policy.
If Stephen Harper desires that the federal government exude a
sense of power and control, he must implement media policies that
restrict the federal government’s employee’s ability to say what they
want – differing opinions on the same subject looks bad in the media,
and should be avoided at all cost. With the enormous number of
public servants in the government, the risk that someone might say
something negative against government policy rises, and with
scientific crises becoming a hot-button issue, the Harper government
“no longer trusts scientists to avoid controversy,”32 especially on
politically sensitive issues like climate change or the oil sands. It is
more essential to demonstrate to voters that every agency of the
federal government is in an agreement with one another. This can be
done in a variety of ways: implementing new media policies for
particular government departments, restricting access to evidence, or
by cutting programs that might lead to the discovery of that evidence.
The Harper government has also favoured the use of experts who are
likely to agree with the official party line in areas of science. For
example, in 2007 the Harper Government announced the creation of
the Science, Technology and Innovation Council, which was
mandated to provide the government independent opinions and
information on scientific and technological issues. However, only four
full-time scientists were a part of this Council: the other fourteen
members were business and industry experts, government officials and
administrators.33
One must be careful of criticizing the government’s desire for
conformity too harshly. After all, many would agree that it is not
unreasonable for a government to expect their employees to respect
the official position taken in the media, or presented to the public. As
Andrew Leach writes in Maclean’s, “To speak out publicly against
government policy is, by the current definition, fundamentally at
31. Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.”
32.Turner, The War on Science, 41.
33.Cuddy, Troubling Evidence, 20.
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odds with the role of a public servant in our democracy.” Federal
scientists are hired to research and present their findings on particular
subjects to the government. They should not be commenting on
issues that do not concern them, nor should they be using their
positions as a soapbox for their own ideas. And while many have
criticized the government for taking this policy on employee
cooperation too far, it does reflect the desire of Stephen Harper to
have a government possessing one unified voice.
With this desire to have a unanimous voice comes the
simultaneous ignoring of voices that do not conform to the
government’s policy ideas. For the Harper Conservatives, this involves
the shutting out of scientists and the inclusion of business and
industry experts. Again, this is not necessarily a Conservative-only
policy – some have argued science has been subordinate to industry
since 1993 with the political shift from the Mulroney Conservatives
to the Chrétien Liberals35 – but the Harper government continues to
use this policy to their advantage, and to put business interests before
scientific interests.
One of the most cited examples of this attitude favouring
business interests over science interests comes from the government’s
implementation of Bill C-38, an omnibus bill that was read into the
law in 2012. This bill continued the tradition of having government
departments such as the National Research Council perform, in the
words of Chris Turner, “’concierge’ services for business and
technology”36 – that is, science should only be used as a tool to assist
the government’s business and industrial interests. It resulted in
massive funding cuts for departments such as Fisheries and Oceans
and Parks Canada. Again, it should be noted that, despite massive
cuts and changes to scientific programs across Canada, scientists were
not consulted during the creation of Bill C-38 in 2011.37 The voices
that the Conservative Party chose to listen to were not scientists, but
were business executives and policy writers.
Authors such as Turner also write that the government intends
to use science as a tool for business interests, rather than seeing value
in science itself. Science and research now has a purpose of “creating
34

34. Andrew Leach, “Un-muzzle The Scientists? Not So Fast,” Maclean’s, August 24, 2014.
35. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,” 131.
36. Turner, The War on Science, 27.
37. Ibid., 29.

65

Muzzles and Mixed Messages

economic opportunities for industry”, while the government’s task “is
to assist in that process in whatever way it can.”38 If science is only to
be used as a tool to bring about economic investments, then the
policies the government is pursuing make sense: they can cut
scientific programs that do not fulfill this purpose (and potentially
hurt this economic investment), can save money to put towards
industrial and business incentives, and can silence any scientist who
would only get in the way of the new economic policy.
If this is the policy that the Conservative government has
chosen to follow, what effect does this have on the average Canadian
citizen? The general consensus seems to be that there are negative
effects. One of the biggest concerns is for the democratic process in
relation to the government’s muzzling policies. If voters cannot access
information that matters to them about their government, they
cannot make informed decisions. The federal government does not
actively circulate their funding decisions or policy implementations
through the public sphere thanks to their media policies – instead, as
Evidence For Democracy notes in their critique of Environment
Canada’s media policies, there is a focus on message control rather
than supporting effective communication between federal
departments and the public.39 How can citizens make the right choice
for them if they cannot access the information they require?
These types of policies also bring about negative connotations
for Canada on the international stage. For example, Gatehouse’s
Maclean’s article noted that serious damage had been done to
Canada’s scientific reputation, and that scientists were losing funding
opportunities due to sponsors’ leeriness of the Canadian government’s
reaction.40 For a country that is synonymous with nature and that has
such a rich history of scientific achievement, this poses a problem.
What does Canada as a country become when it loses a part of its
treasured identity?
Finally, it is arguable that science plays a major role in the
Canadian system – even if, as the Conservative government puts
forward, it is just a ‘concierge’ for business interests. According to Jeff
Kinder and Frank Welsh, this scientific and technological system has
38. Ibid., 112.
39 Magnuson-Ford and Gibbs, “Can Scientists Speak?,” 13.
40. Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.”
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developed thanks to a unique relationship between “business,
academic and government sectors.”41 If the government wishes to
continue to use this system, all three sectors must be properly funded
and respected. In essence, the government has to hold up its end of
the agreement. Otherwise, the system risks underperformance or
failure, and many aspects of Canadians’ lives could be affected.42 If
the government wishes to continue to provide Canadian citizens a
high quality of life, they must fund and encourage the development
of science in the federal sectors. Ultimately, science and politics have
enjoyed an uneasy relationship in Canada for decades, and the
criticisms of the Conservative’s policies are just the latest in a series of
decisions that echo this relationship. These are policies that reflect the
desire to have conformity and unity in all departments of the federal
government, and that also reflect science’s decreasing importance to
the government – except in cases of economic value. With these
policies affecting Canada’s reputation on the international stage, and
potentially harming the democratic process at home, it remains to be
seen whether the current Conservative government will continue to
uphold them. What is clear, however, is that there is no easy balance
between science and politics in Canada.

41. Jeff Kinder and Frank Welsh, “Performing Strategic Science in the Public Interest: Updating the
Policy Debate Regarding Government Science,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of
Science, Technology and Medicine 35.1 (2012): 149, doi: 10.7202/1013984ar
42. Ibid.
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